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Book Review 
PREEMPTION CHOICE IN CONTEXT 
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND 
REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION. 
William W. Buzbee, ed.1 New York, Cambridge University 
Press. 2009. Pp. xv+ 319. $90.00 (Cloth). 
Michael S. Greve2 
INTRODUCTION 
Preemption law, not so long ago a province of legal 
technicians and policy specialists, has become the subject of an 
increasingly voluble and contentious debate. Intense political 
and interest group fights over the preemptive scope of federal 
law, in areas from global warming to financial regulation to 
consumer products, have been covered in the popular press. 
Preemption cases form a core part of the Roberts Court's docket 
of "business cases," itself a matter of considerable controversy 
and commentary.3 Scholarly books and articles on preemption 
have proliferated in recent years.4 
1. Professor and Director of the Environmental and Natural Resources Law 
Program, Emory University School of Law. 
2. Ph.D. (Cornell University, 1987); John G. Searle Scholar, American Enterprise 
Institute. 
3. For press coverage of preemption, see, e.g., Alicia Mundy & Brent Kendall, 
Shift Toward State Rules on Product Liability, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2009, at A3. For the 
Roberts Court's "business docket" see, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc., N. Y. 
TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38. Law review articles include: Robin Conrad, The 
Roberts Court and the Myth of a Pro-Business Bias, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 997 (2009) 
and Jonathan Adler, Business, the Environment, and the Roberts Court: A Preliminary 
Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943 (2009). See also Doug Kendall, Big Business's 
Big Term, SLATE (Mar. 5, 2008), http://www.slate.com/id/2185844/; David C. Vladek, 
Safety Last, THE NATION (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.thenation.com/article/safety-last; 
David G. Savage, High Court Is Good For Business, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at Al; 
Alicia Mundy & Shirley S. Wang, In Drug Case, Justices to Weigh Right to Sue, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 27, 2008, at Bl; Editorial, Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at Al8. 
4. See, e.g., THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL 
BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES (2008); Symposium, Ordering State-Federal 
679 
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Preemption Choice, a collection of essays expertly organized 
and edited by William W. Buzbee, promises to add to the debate 
and the burgeoning literature by contributing "to the 
development of normative arguments against preemption" (p. 
3). "Development" is a bit of an exaggeration. Most of the 
authors have elaborated their positions against preemption 
elsewhere, often, and in much greater detail; the book's virtue 
lies in compiling concise, accessible summaries of their views. 
"Normative" and "against," in contrast, are apt 
characterizations. Preemption Choice contains summaries of the 
Supreme Court's jurisprudence (Christopher H. Schroeder) and 
of preemption doctrine and its interplay with federalism theory 
(Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson); these economical 
and characteristically competent essays go easy on polemics and 
normative prescriptions. It also contains an essay by Bradford R. 
Clark, arguing that the Supremacy Clause, correctly understood, 
not only grounds but also limits the federal government's 
preemptive authority. With these exceptions, though, the volume 
is given over to advocates of "polyphonic," "dynamic," 
"interactive," "adaptive," or "empowerment" federalism. The 
varying adjectives"'--- for purposes at hand, I will stick with 
"polyphonic" - aim to capture supposedly salutary features of a 
federalism conception that embodies a deep skepticism about 
the federal preemption of state law. Congress, the contributors 
agree, should use its powers to set a regulatory "floor" 
underneath the states. In the absence of federal minimum 
requirements (for example, for product safety or environmental 
quality), states are likely to "race to the bottom."5 Above the 
floor, however, states should be left free to adopt more stringent, 
protective regulations. Concurrent state and federal regulation -
and, for producers in interstate commerce, a polyphony of at 
least fifty-one regulators for any given product or transaction6 -
Relations through Federal Preemption Doctrine, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (2007); 
Symposium, Federal Preemption of State Tort Law: The Problem of Medical Drugs and 
Devices, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2005); FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, 
NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007). 
5. Buzbee, pp. 8-9, 98-104, calls federal minimum standards "floor preemption." 
The usage is a bit idiosyncratic. True preemption, called "ceiling preemption" by Buzbee, 
deprives state law above the ceiling of any force and effect. In contrast, "floor 
preemption" has no legal displacement effect. For example, a $9 federal minimum wage 
leaves state minima above and below that floor in force: if a state has a minimum wage of 
$8, an employer who pays $7 can still be prosecuted for violating both federal and state 
law. As a practical matter, of course, it is true that "floor preemption" wipes out the 
lower-minimum states' policy choice. 
6. "At least," because several contributors place special emphasis on the salutary 
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ought to be the general rule. In essay after essay, the authors 
expound on the virtues of federalism, so conceived: it will 
facilitate state experimentation, compensate for federal 
agencies' failures, create information-producing feedback loops 
among regulators, and allow for the dynamic adaptation of 
regulatory regimes in response to changed circumstances or new 
information. 
The notion that polyphonic, concurrent regulation might 
also have significant drawbacks-that state officials, and jurors, 
as well as federal regulators, may have warped incentives, that 
concurrent powers might produce cacophony rather than 
polyphony, that public purposes might get lost in an 
intergovernmental shuffle, or that compounding legal 
obligations might result in excessive regulation-does not 
unduly trouble the contributors. Occasional acknowledgments of 
"common pro-preemption arguments" (p. 3) based on 
considerations of uniformity, finality, democratic accountability, 
or economies of scale are quickly waved aside. The most explicit 
recognition of polyphony's potential "pitfalls" (Robert A. 
Shapiro's, pp. 44-46) terminates in the confident conclusion that 
"[t]he management of dynamic overlap is a task best performed 
by branches of government other than the courts." (p. 46). 
Agreement on the normative priors allows the editor and 
contributors to trace the implications of their view through a 
wide range of subtle yet salient questions-for example, the 
preemption of state tort law (David C. Vladeck), the role of 
statutory "savings clauses" in favor of state law (Sandi Zellmer), 
federal preemption by inaction rather than affirmative 
prohibition (Robert L. Glicksman), and preemption by agency 
choice rather than explicit legislative mandate (William Funk). 
However and alas, the inordinate emphasis on ideological and 
thematic coherence limits both the informational value of 
Preemption Choice and the plausibility of its federalism vision. 
POLYPHONY IN CONTEXT 
For readers who are unfamiliar with the preemption debate 
of the past half-decade, Preemption Choice may seem 
disorienting. One question arises from the avowedly liberal­
progressive thrust of the federalism project embraced in this 
role of non-preempted state courts and juries. In that world, the upper bound of 
regulators is defined not by the number of states but by plaintiffs' lawyers' forum choices. 
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volume. If memory serves, federalism used to be the 
conservative Rehnquist Court's agenda, about which 
progressives had little positive to say. Have they changed their 
minds, or do they mean something very different by 
"federalism"? A second question is how and why the once­
obscure preemption question (a statutory question, is it not?) has 
mutated into "Federalism's Core Question" (a constitutional 
issue-no?).7 Preemption Choice does not directly engage these 
questions. The closest it comes to addressing them is Robert A. 
Shapiro's essay on the law's path "From Dualism to Polyphony." 
Shapiro rightly suggests that the federalism embraced in 
Preemption Choice has a pedigree in the Progressive Era and the 
New Deal-which, notwithstanding its nationalist impulses, 
always embodied a potent pro-state streak, famously captured in 
Justice Brandeis' celebration of states as "laboratories of 
democracy."8 Progressive-polyphonic federalism's foe and foil is 
the "dual" federalism of the nineteenth century, which operated 
against a baseline of separate and exclusive spheres of federal 
and state jurisdiction. Dual federalism was dislodged by the New 
Deal. Contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, however, the 
New Deal did not simply trump federalism and the states with 
"nationalist" policies, institutions, and legal doctrines. Rather, 
Shapiro notes (citing Stephen Gardbaum's important writings on 
the subject), the New Deal unleashed both the national 
government and the states from the strictures of the "old" 
Constitution (pp. 37-41).9 An integral part of that 
transformation was a state-protective shift in preemption 
doctrine. The pre-New Deal Court usually operated with a 
doctrine of "latent exclusivity": once Congress had entered a 
regulatory arena, state regulation in the field was deemed 
preempted regardless of any direct conflict with federal law, and 
regardless of whether or not Congress had intended that result.10 
In the post-New Deal era, in contrast, preemption law turns on 
7. The extent to which constitutional presumptions should drive statutory 
preemption analysis has been a matter of some controversy among the Justices. See, e.g., 
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 
U.S. 861 (2000). 
8. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
9. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the 
States, 64 CHI. L. REV. 483 (1997) [hereinafter, Gardbaum, New Deal]. 
10. Stephen Gardbaum, The Breadth vs. the Depth of Congress's Commerce Power: 
The Curious History of Preemption during the Lochner Era, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: 
STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 48 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve 
eds., 2007) [hereinafter Gardbaum, Breadth vs. Depth]. 
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the intent of Congress. Barring an outright conflict between 
federal and state law, state law continues to operate, concurrent 
with federal law, unless Congress preempts the states either 
expressly or by "clear and manifest" implication.11 
At one level, progressive federalism has changed little over 
the past century. "Dynamism," "adaptation," and "polyphony" 
are simply new monikers for the perceived advantages of the 
"cooperative" federalism championed by Felix Frankfurter and 
Louis Brandeis. However, the context of those arguments has 
changed in two highly salient ways. First, the federalism debate 
of the Progressive era covered a much wider range of legal 
questions. Federal preemption was a federalism question back 
then12 - but not "Federalism's Core Question" by any stretch. In 
part, this has to do with the lower density of federal legislation at 
the time. In much larger part, it has to do with the fact that the 
pre-New Deal Court viewed the protection of the commerce of 
the United States against state exploitation as its foremost 
constitutional obligation. To that end, the Court administered a 
raft of constitutional and jurisdictional doctrines. Among them 
was the dormant Commerce Clause, which loomed much larger 
then than it does now, both in terms of its doctrinal breadth and 
by the sheer number of Supreme Court decisions.13 There was 
the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction and the federal general 
common law of Swift v. Tyson,14 which gave parties in interstate 
commerce an escape from what we now call state "hellhole 
jurisdictions." There was the substantive due process doctrine of 
Lochner notoriety, which restricted state legislation and 
regulation in many of the domains where polyphonists would 
dearly love to see it exercised. (Justice Brandeis' paean to state 
experimentation, of course, originated in this context. )15 To these 
familiar doctrines, one could add others-for example, the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, restrictive doctrines of personal 
jurisdiction, or the then-potent "extraterritoriality" prong of the 
Due Process Clause, all of which curbed the reach of state law 
over interstate commerce. 
Virtually all of these doctrines disappeared in the wake of 
the New Deal.16 The brief historical detour, then, answers the 
11. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
12. For a concise summary, see Gardbaum, Breadth vs. Depth, supra note 10. 
13. Shapiro notes its reduced scope after New Deal: p. 40. 
14. 41 u. s. 1 (1842). 
15. New State Ice Co., v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
16. For a survey of the doctrines and their demise, see Gardbaum, New Deal, supra 
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initial question of why preemption has become federalism's 
"core" question: with the arguable exception of a softened and 
embattled dormant Commerce Clause,17 it is the only still-extant 
state-restrictive doctrine of any practical consequence. This 
point has doctrinal and practical significance. If the once-narrow 
preemption debate now teems with constitutional presumptions 
and macro-theoretical federalism arguments, that is because the 
humble doctrine has come to do all the work of the long­
discarded constitutional doctrines. And if preemption has 
become ground zero in a grim trench war between producer 
interests and their adversaries, that is because both sides 
recognize preemption as the last legal obstacle to an 
environment in which state regulators operate without any 
meaningful legal restraint. 
Polyphonists have emphatically made their preemption 
choice. That is fine and good, and, as noted, seeing the troops in 
close array has its advantages. Candor on the point, however, 
would have been more becoming than the false air of 
deliberation that hovers over this volume, beginning with its 
title.18 Better yet would be a recognition and acknowledgment 
that the fight over contemporary preemption law, viewed against 
a broader federalism background and trajectory, is over the last 
inches of territory. 
A CHEER FOR THE NEW DEAL CONSTITUTION 
Polyphonists, as just seen, are heirs to the New Deal 
tradition; but they would also radicalize that tradition. The New 
Deal's commitment to enhancing state authority over interstate 
note 9. 
17. "Embattled," in that conservative Justices (as well as some scholars) have 
repeatedly criticized the doctrine as an illegitimate judicial invention and called for its 
sharp curtailment or even its demise. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. Dep't of 
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 595 (1997) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting); see also United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (Roberts, C. J.). Shapiro, p. 47, criticizes the 
Roberts Court's "aggressive use of the dormant Commerce Clause." That 
characterization, highly doubtful even when written, has become untenable in light of 
subsequent decisions. See Norman R. Williams & Brandon P. Denning, The "New 
Protectionism" and the American Common Market, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247 (2009). 
18. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) ("I will not amuse you with 
an appearance of deliberation when I have decided."). Buzbee, p. 3, endeavors to convey 
an impression of over-all "balance" and promises that "[s]everal chapters explore and 
enrich . . .  common pro-preemption arguments." I have been unable to find those 
chapters. 
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commerce and corporations was still checked by countervailing, 
"nationalist" impulses. The dominant form of New Deal 
regulation was the management of industry sectors by expert 
administrative agencies. That model requires protection against 
collateral attack and state interference-including preemgtion­
protective judicial doctrines, some of them quite robust. The 
over-all ambivalence between state empowerment and 
nationalism is embodied in the still-canonical preemption 
formula of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 20 Rice captures the 
nationalist side in a judicial willingness to imply federal 
preemption where Congress has failed to express it. The state­
friendly, polyphonic side is captured in an (erratically enforced) 
"presumption against preemption. "21 
The New Deal regulatory model fell out of favor a half­
century ago. Critics Left and Right concluded that supposed 
expert agencies were often "captured" by regulated industries 
and that "regulation" often amounted to little more than the 
national organization of labor, industrial, and agricultural 
cartels. This critique looms large in the preemption and 
federalism theory of Preemption Choice. Concurrent state 
regulation, the theory holds, will compensate for the manifest 
failures of federal regulatory agencies-their capture, 
ossification, lack of resources, and information deficits. It is 
difficult to quarrel with the implicit critique of New Deal 
regulation. It is equally difficult to defend the preemption 
formula of the New Deal Constitution, the source of a 
universally lamented "muddle" in preemption law.22 It is still 
harder, however, to endorse the proposed, polyphonic remedy. 
For all its flaws, the New Deal model, or rather its 
nationalist streak, sought to protect legitimate interests in 
administrative expertise and coherent public administration. 
19. The National Labor Relations Board's near-exclusive authority, for example, 
was and is to this day protected by decidedly monophonic preemption doctrines. See 
Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 
(1976); S.D. Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957). If polyphonists were to 
consider these doctrines (which they do not), they might come to question the facile 
assumption that firm (ceiling) preemption automatically embodies pro-corporate, anti­
consumer preferences. 
20. 331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
21. For more on this tension, see Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, 
Conclusion, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 309, 
317-18 (2007). 
22. Nary an article on the subject fails to note the consensus that preemption law is 
a "muddle." See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 233 (2000) (noting 
the point and providing references). 
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And for all the inanity of its economic theories,23 the New Deal 
model still reflected production values: it sought to stabilize 
economic markets, not to destroy them. The federalism theory 
on display in Preemption Choice does not so much disavow those 
orientations; it fails to even contemplate them. David C. 
Vladeck, for example, inveighs against preempting state tort 
lawsuits over "mislabeled" or unduly dangerous pharmaceutical 
products. The obvious objection that lay juries lack expertise is 
met with the reply that tort suits will bring new information to 
light (pp. 69-71). That may be so-but at what price to product 
availability and incentives for innovation? Similarly, Trevor 
Morrison would expose financial and other industries to 
increased oversight, investigation, and expansive conduct 
remedies by state attorneys general. He is unperturbed that 
attorneys general-unlike (say) the Securities and Exchange 
Commission or the Comptroller of the Currency-have little 
working knowledge of the industries and no official 
responsibility for their effective operation. 
That blithe indifference to production values is common to 
all the normatively oriented essays in Preemption Choice. 
Polyphonists look to consumer interests in more protection and 
compensation, to the virtual exclusion of producer-firms' and 
their employees'. Nor do they believe in expertise or in coherent 
public policy. Their case rests on an exceedingly confident 
assumption to the effect that more regulation is ipso facto better 
regulation. 
LIMITS? TRADE-OFFS? 
None of the authors states the absurd more-is-better 
premise in haec verba. However, it is difficult to make sense of 
polyphony on any other assumption. Apart from perfunctory 
acknowledgments of pro-preemption concerns, the polyphony 
on display in Preemption Choice recognizes neither limits nor 
trade-offs. One scours the volume in vain for a single real-world 
example of a federal preemptive statute, or a Supreme Court 
finding of preemption, that would find favor with the author. 
Three examples further illustrate the point. 
23. See Richard A. Posner, Brandeis and Holmes, Business and Economics, Then 
and Now, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 1, 5 (2005) (noting that Justice Brandeis supported many 
New Deal programs, such as maximum hour and minimum wage laws, the goal of the 
latter being "(to put it bluntly) . . .  to force up wages by monopolizing the labor supply"). 
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Subject-Matter. The contributions to Preemption Choice 
are devoted almost exclusively to two regulatory areas: health 
and safety regulation, especially the federal Food and Drug 
Administration's (FDA) approval of prescription drugs and 
medical devices; and environmental regulation, especially the 
regulation of global warming and greenhouse gases. These are 
important areas, and they have occupied a great deal of judicial 
attention. They are also prime fields of federal preemption over 
state tort law (as distinct from legislative or administrative 
measures), a question that has proven particularly contentious.24 
Even so, a broader inquiry would have illuminated both the 
trade-offs involved in preemption choice, and, moreover, 
polyphonic federalism's intended scope and content. 
Consider, even if Preemption Choice does not, the 
regulation of common carriers such as airlines, truckers, and 
railroads: federal preemptive statutes categorically prohibit 
states from any regulation "relating to" the rates, routes, or 
services of such enterprises.25 These provisions are the 
centerpieces of common carrier regulation (one cannot 
deregulate airlines without affirmatively prohibiting the states 
from re-regulating them), and the Supreme Court has 
consistently defended them against state evasion.26 Is that 
preemption choice right, or wrong? One can imagine a 
polyphonic answer either way. 
Environmental, health, and safety regulation involves highly 
complex, technically challenging decisions about managing risk 
under conditions of great uncertainty. That context may be 
thought to produce a prima facie case for adaptation, dynamism, 
feedback, and other polyphonic virtues. But that is not so, a 
sensible polyphonist might concede, with conventional price and 
entry regulations. The subject-matter is low-tech; the economic 
theory is well understood; and experiments are pointless when 
we know them to be inefficient, as with price and entry 
regulation. 
The argument sounds plausible, and it would give content 
and contours to polyphony. But I made it up, and on the 
evidence of Preemption Choice, it is impossible to know whether 
24. For empirical evidence, see Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in 
the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 52 (2006) 
(showing that tort preemption cases are more contested). 
25. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(b)(l) (2006). For airlines, see 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(l) (2006). 
26. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992); Rowe v. N.H. 
Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008). 
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any polyphonist would credit it.27 Does the regulatory context 
matter? Or is it that health and safety regulation, unlike price 
and entry regulation, often implicates claims for individual 
compensation, which warrant special consideration? Or should 
polyphony reign across the board, such that the federal 
deregulation statutes were misguided and the Supreme Court 
decision interpreting them erroneous? In failing to address 
questions of this sort, Preemption Choice fails to give the reader 
a sense of polyphony's intended limits, if any. 
Risk and Expertise. Even within the area of health, safety, 
and environmental regulation, polyphony's intended scope 
remains murky.28 The central legal issue in this arena is the 
question of whether federal standards should be understood-in 
the absence of an express preemption provision -as a federal 
minimum or "floor" that lets states experiment with more 
restrictive requirements, as polyphony would have it; or whether 
such standards should be understood as establishing a 
preemptive "ceiling" as well as a floor. The Supreme Court has 
wavered between these two approaches. Ceiling-and-floor 
decisions (most prominently, Justice Breyer's majority opinion 
in Geier v. Honda Motor Co.)29 often interpret federal standards 
as embodying a deliberate effort to establish a regulatory 
"optimum." Several contributors harshly criticize this position. It 
presupposes, Thomas 0. McGarity writes, "that the [federal] 
agencies are doing such an effective job of protecting the public 
ex ante that the added incentives provided by the common law 
are unnecessary and the amount of residual damage caused by 
27. The firm preemption provisions at issue serve none of the pro-preemption 
values acknowledged, however cavalierly, in Preemption Choice (uniformity, finality, 
accountability, economies of scale). Their principal purpose and effect is to wipe out the 
states' (as well as the carriers') regulatory rents-in contrast to other, more "polyphonic" 
regimes (for example, telecommunications) that proteCt those rents to the detriment of 
consumers. See, e.g., Robert Crandall, Local and Long Distance Competition: Replacing 
Regulation with Competition, in COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION AND FCC REFORM 
53 (Randolph J. May & Jeffrey A. Eisenach eds., 2001); Thomas W. Hazlett, ls Federal 
Preemption Efficient in Cellular Phone Regulation? 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 155 (2003). 
Whether the contributors to Preemption Choice are pro- or anti-rent, I cannot say. 
28. E.g., p. 295: "Clearly, where a proliferating polyglot of state-level regulations 
becomes enormously disruptive to the economy, federal preemption may be warranted." 
(emphasis added). A sentence that starts on "clearly" and ends in evasion might have 
been given some content by means of reference to, or discussion of, an actual case. See, 
e.g,. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) ("As a practical 
matter, complying with the FDA's detailed regulatory regime in the shadow of 50 States' 
tort regimes will dramatically increase the burdens facing potential applicants-burdens 
not contemplated by Congress in enacting the FDCA and the MDA."). Is that 
consideration sufficiently "enormously disruptive"? 
29. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861, 864 (2000). 
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the regulated products or activities is acceptably low." (p. 255). 
This confident avennent, however, grossly misstates the 
"optimum" position both with respect to the compensatory and 
the deterrence function of state common law.30 
As for "damage," everyone agrees that federal statutes 
establish incomplete regulatory regimes that deal with 
prevention, to the exclusion of compensatory mechanisms. 
Almost everyone agrees that the erratic, high-transaction-cost 
tort system is a lousy way of providing compensation. (The best 
reply is that the tort system will have to do so long as no other 
compensation device is reliably available.) The question, then, is 
how to combine two imperfect systems without unduly 
compromising the function of either. A large, subtle, 
sophisticated literature deals with that difficult trade-off and 
exercise in institutional coordination.31 Not one of the major 
contributions merits a citation, let alone discussion, in 
Preemption Choice. 
As for the "effectiveness" of federal law, the case for 
understanding federal agency standards as a preemptive 
optimum rather than a mere floor does not rest on any cheerful 
assumption about the competence of federal agencies but on a 
rough institutional calculus. Health and safety regulation 
typically presents risks on either side. Every life-saving drug will 
have dangers, and every label will create dangers of over- as well 
as under-warning. While there are reasons to think that federal 
health and safety agencies will at times under-protect public 
health, there are equally potent reasons to think that they will 
often suffer from an excess of caution.32 Polyphony offers no 
remedy for that systemic failure; it only cuts one way. A good 
30. The Supreme Court's preemption cases have vacillated in their emphasis on the 
compensation and deterrence functions of tort law. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products 
Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 450, 459 (2008) 
[hereinafter Sharkey, Products Liability]. 
31. For examples in one single regulatory arena (the approval and labeling of 
pharmaceutical drugs and devices) see, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by 
Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 
237-43 (2007); Sharkey, Products Liability, supra note 30, at 459; Richard Nagareda, 
FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. 4 (2006); 
Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 463 (2009). For a post-Preemption Choice discussion see Catherine M. 
Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law Products Liability 
Claims, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 437, 445 (2009). All articles contain further extensive 
citations and references. 
32. See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. 
ECON. 677, 707 (1975); Cass Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 407, 418 (1990). 
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case can be made for institutional redundancy as an error­
correcting or feedback mechanism. Barring an unsustainable 
"more is always better" presumption, however, there is every 
reason to distrust a one-directional mechanism. That caution 
applies with special force to "error correction" by inexpert juries 
with massive hindsight bias. 33 
Incentives. The contributors to Preemption Choice are 
effusive on the good things that concurrent state regulation 
"can" or "will" contribute to a world governed by poorly 
incentivized federal regulators. They are close to mum on the 
incentives that might induce state regulators to do just the 
opposite. 
In an intriguing contribution, Trevor W. Morrison argues 
that courts should direct their preemption inquiry, not so much 
to subject-matter but rather to "the identity of the actor 
enforcing the state law" (p. 81). State attorneys general, he 
argues, ought to receive special deference in preemption cases, 
both on the part of federal regulators and by courts. With few 
exceptions, state attorneys general -unlike regulators- are 
directly elected by their respective state electorates. Deference 
would therefore promote federalism values of accountability and 
democratic self-governance.34 Moreover, it would "recognize[] 
the enormous potential value of state attorneys general to the 
enforcement of both state and federal law" (p. 94). Morrison 
discusses only a single objection to his proposal- to wit, the 
apprehension that state attorney general proceedings against 
predominantly out-of-state corporations might have 
troublesome extraterritorial consequences and inflict economic 
costs on shareholders or workers in other states. Having stated 
the concern, Morrison dismisses it out of hand. Federal 
33. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008) ("A jury . . .  sees only the 
cost of a more dangerous design, and is not concerned with its benefits; the patients who 
reaped those benefits are not represented in court."). 
34. Morrison acknowledges the (fairly minor) problem that not all attorneys 
general are elected. He ignores the far larger problem that attorneys general are not the 
only elected officials in any given state-and that the prospect of substantial settlement 
awards may derange democratic separation of powers arrangements at the state level. 
Many attorneys general are entrusted with fearsome prosecutorial powers. Among the 
reasons for tolerating those powers is, or was, a system of legislative budget controls-a 
crude yet vital safeguard against excessive enforcement, especially where enforcement 
authority is poorly defined. That safeguard is eviscerated when large financial recoveries 
tum attorneys general into profit centers for cash-strapped legislatures: in-between 
elections, state attorneys general are effectively liberated to act as entrepreneurial trial 
lawyers with a badge. There may still be a plausible "accountability" or "democracy" 
argument in favor of Morrison's proposal, but it would have to be a great deal more 
nuanced. 
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preemption, he writes, compromises state regulatory authority. 
State attorneys general, in supposed contrast, cannot do so; they 
can only inflict economic losses. This account grossly understates 
the extraterritoriality problem and wholly ignores institutional 
features that render state attorneys general more rather than less 
problematic. 
State officials have no encompassing interest in the 
collective welfare of the nation as a whole. They are supposed to 
look exclusively to their own constituents' welfare, to the 
exclusion of anyone else's. They will therefore underestimate or 
ignore the external costs of their regulations, so long as the 
regulations confer some in-state benefit. More problematically 
still, they may attempt to impose costs on out-of-state entities 
and to transfer the proceeds. The strategy is welfare-maximizinPs 
for all officeholders, provided the aggression goes undetected. 5 
It is rational, moreover, for each state's voters to elect 
candidates who promise to maximize the in-state gains 
regardless of external costs. Under a legal regime that poses no 
meaningful impediment to state cost exports, each state's 
citizens will pay the price of other states' exploitative strategies 
in any event. The only plausible response is to return the favor. 
While the institutional calculus just sketched applies to all 
state regulators, it applies with special force to state attorneys 
general. Unlike securities or utility regulators, state attorneys 
general have no responsibility for the effective functioning of 
any industry (perhaps excepting the litigation industry). Their 
ordinary mode of "regulation" is not rulemaking pursuant to a 
statute that embodies some rough legislative choices; it is 
investigation and prosecution, often under open-ended, general­
purpose civil or criminal fraud statutes. This feature routinely 
produces a regulatory "process" in which all the heuristics are 
wrong.36 The attorney general's demands for conduct remedies 
will be informed by a generalist's perception of the outlier case 
under investigation, as opposed to an expert regulator's 
understanding of the practices and organization of a 
sophisticated industry. The remedies will be shaped, not in an 
open notice-and-comment rulemaking process but rather by the 
35. For some empirical evidence of this calculus and its operation in one regulatory 
arena, see Michael S. Greve, Cartel Federalism?: Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys 
General, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (2005). 
36. Richard J. Zeckhauser & Frederick Schauer, The Trouble With Cases, in 
LITIGATION VERSUS REGULATION (Daniel Kessler & Andrei Shleifer eds., forthcoming 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1446897. 
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parties' settlement incentives and in closed-door negotiations. 
There is no intelligible reason to trust this process, and ample 
reason to worry about the potential for collusion and self-
d 1. 37 ea mg. 
Morrison's offhand argument that this arrangement does 
not violate any state's formal regulatory authority is 
implausible,38 and, in any event, beside the point. The question is 
whether we should embrace a preemption regime that is 
virtually certain to produce aggregate losses all around. 
Assuming, of course, that we care about them. 
POLYPHONY AND PREEMPTION: PROSPECTS 
Preemption Choice seeks to integrate the analysis of 
preemption law with high-level federalism theory. For better or 
worse, though, the link is tenuous. The high-level theory is too 
implausible and, frankly, too unserious to gain much traction; in 
addition, its launch in Preemption Choice may suffer from bad 
timing. In contrast, polyphonic preemption law will likely gain 
further ground, for reasons having nothing to do with polyphonic 
theory. 
Preemption Choice, as noted, is preoccupied with the 
regulation of complex, technically challenging problems of 
national and, indeed, global reach. In these venues, the case for 
polyphonic federalism teems with complications­
extraterritoriality, the need for expertise, public choice and 
incentive problems, the loss of transparency and accountability 
that invariably attends "cooperative" federal-state regimes, and 
so on. Having recognized the difficulties aside, polyphonic 
(adaptive, dynamic, empowerment) federalism can do no better 
37. The most appalling example remains the 1998 "Master Settlement Agreement" 
(MSA) among 46 states, the major tobacco manufacturers, and plaintiffs' lawyers. 
Though nominally designated as a settlement of state lawsuits against the tobacco 
manufacturers, the agreement had the purpose and effect of creating a tobacco cartel 
that has produced hundreds of billions of dollars in monopoly profits. The MSA 
guarantees states and plaintiffs' lawyers a share of those profits. For accounts of the 
MSA's genesis, nature, and effects see, e.g., Ian Ayres, Using Tort Settlements To 
Cartelize, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 595 (2000); MARTHA DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE 163-208 
(2002); Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 Mo. L. REV. 
285, 346 (2003). 
38. It is implausible because the authority that remains unaffected by attorney 
general interventions and their extraterritorial effects is the authority to prohibit. Sister­
state authority to tolerate or promote certain forms of private conduct is compromised 
all the time. If a product or service disappears nationwide because of a single state's law 
(as with design defect lawsuits), that is the equivalent of what Buzbee calls "floor 
preemption." See supra note 5. 
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than to brush them aside. It would gain credibility as a general 
theory if it started instead with easy, intuitively appealing cases 
and, having drawn skeptical readers into its orbit, worked 
through the complications. The most compelling case for 
polyphony, it seems to me, is "moral" federalism-regulation of 
the death penalty, abortion, gay marriage, and perhaps the 
public display of religious symbols. Unlike the states' 
experiments on out-of-state producers, their regulation of their 
own citizens' mores presents no extraterritoriality concerns 
worth worrying about. Morals politics is noisy and not always 
pretty; but it is also entrepreneurial, democratic, and unaffected 
by the rent-seeking orgies that are the stuff of regulatory policy. 
In sharp contrast to the fiendishly difficult risk-risk trade-offs in 
pharmaceutical markets or the daunting scientific complexities 
of climate change policy, morals issues are low-tech, high-values. 
On such questions, all the advantages go to a system that leaves 
room for decentralized decision-making-all the more so 
because those decisions are usually made at the ballot box or by 
popular referendum, not by hand-picked jurors with hindsight 
bias or by state officials with misaligned incentives. In short, in 
the morals context, what's not to like about polyphony? 
The fact that no polyphonist, in Preemption Choice or, to 
the best of my knowledge, anywhere else, seems to have even 
thought of arguing from the easy morals case to the hard 
regulatory cases suggests, to this reader at least, a lack of 
theoretical seriousness. For all its pretensions, polyphony is not 
and does not really want to be a general federalism theory at all. 
It is a theory by progressives, for progressive ends and in defense 
of a preconceived preference for more regulation. William 
Eskridge's dust cover blurb helpfully identifies the polemical 
targets of Preemption Choice-the business-friendly, pro­
preemption Bush Administration and the Roberts Court.39 
While one of those targets has since become history, post­
publication events-the election of a progressive 
Administration, and a near-unprecedented financial crisis-may 
appear to have rendered the polyphonic agenda especially 
timely. It is equally likely, however, that those events have 
produced, or will in time produce, a mismatch between 
progressive theory and progressive politics on preemption. 
39. "A common theme is that the Bush Administration and the Supreme Court 
have undermined both federalism and good regulatory policy by heeding business 
demands for preemption of state common law across whole areas of law." 
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Polyphonic federalism imperils not just private corporations in 
interstate commerce. It threatens any kind of project, private or 
public, that requires central coordination and a coherent 
weighing of competing public objectives. Thus, for a progressive 
Administration with very grand objectives, polphony may not be 
a natural choice. For example, polyphonic federalism has a clear 
preemption prescription for design defect lawsuits against 
General Motors; an Administration that owns GM may have 
different ideas.4° For another example, the Administration has 
touted its intentions to promote "green" forms of energy, from 
wind to solar. Those industries cannot be subsidized up to scale; 
expanding them will, or would, require firm federal preemptions 
of state law.41 Similarly, the financial crisis may strengthen the 
polyphonic case only at first impression. Of course, the crisis has 
been widely attributed to a woeful lack of oversight and 
regulation by federal authorities, and the notion that polyphony 
might have prevented unconscionable risk-taking on Wall Street, 
depredations in the subprime mortgage market, and reckless 
profiteering in the financial industries may fall on receptive 
ears.42 However, the federal government needs private financial 
institutions for any number of purposes-for example, to 
restructure existing mortgages, to provide credit to an ailing 
small business sector, and to buy and unload alarming piles of 
United States debt instruments. Polyphonic federalism could 
easily frustrate any of these objectives. It is well-suited to 
appropriating the profits of private financial institutions. It is 
wholly unsuited to the emerging system of govemment­
sponsored finance capitalism. 
For all that, polyphony's preemption prescriptions may well 
gain ground. At the legislative level, Buzbee rightly notes (p. 2), 
non-preemption is the ordinary choice in any event. Polyphonic 
federalism theory's chief function is to supply more or less 
40. For an overview of the controversy, see Jody Xu, GM's Bankruptcy: What 
Happens to People Who Had Lawsuits Against GM?, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2009, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/06/02/gms-bankruptcy-what-happens-to-people-who-had­
lawsuits-against-gm/tab/article/. 
41. For example, see Renewable Electricity: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Energy 
and Natural Resources, llOth Cong. 9-15, 59-65, 84 (2008) (statements of T. Boone 
Pickens & Donald N. Furman). 
42. That is certainly the operative premise behind the recently enacted federal 
reforms that substantially weaken federal agencies' exclusive jurisdiction over federally 
chartered financial institutions and expose those enterprises to visitation, regulation, and 
litigation by state officials and to private lawsuits under state law. See Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1041-1046, 124 
Stat. 1376, 2011-18 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
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plausible post hoc rationalizations for results that are 
preordained by political dynamics and dysfunctions. At the 
judicial level, judicial preemption choices that are consistent with 
polyphonic presumptions are not dependent on those 
presumptions. As Bradford R. Clark's essay in Preemption 
Choice suggests, anti-preemption positions have of late gained 
favor among conservative, clause-bound originalists, including 
those on the Supreme Court.43 That tendency is in no way 
Gerived from, or even in sympathy with, polyphony and its 
liberal-progressive intentions; it is driven by such standard 
conservative tropes as deference to Congress, interpretive 
textualism, and respect for state sovereignty. While Preemption 
Choice views "common pro-preemption arguments" as dominant 
and even ascendant (see e.g., pp. 3, 46-51 ), it appears that those 
arguments have lost traction in many quarters and across a 
broad spectrum of political and jurisprudential views. 
Polyphonic federalism may thus prevail despite its lack of 
theoretical appeal: it no longer has an enemy. 
43. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1210 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009) (Scalia, J.). 
